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 Religious accommodation in the United States has a complex 
history. Courts have long struggled to balance the twin concerns of 
protecting religious freedom and maintaining the separation of church 
and state. Since the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA)
1
, on March 23, 2010, these religious concerns have 
once again come to the forefront. Since its inception, the ACA has 
spurred an onslaught of litigation, especially in regard to the 
controversial “contraceptive mandate.”
 2
  The contraceptive mandate 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.S. in News-Editorial Journalism and Minor in Spanish, University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, May 2010. I would like to thank Professor Hal Morris 
and my family and friends for their continuous support. I would like to especially 
thank my parents, John and Julie Herbick, and my brothers, Andrew and Mike 
Herbick, for all of their love and support. 
1
 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  
2
 See Jonathan T. Tan, Nonprofit Organizations, For-Profit Corporations, and 
the HHS Mandate: Why the Mandate Does Not Satisfy RFRA’s Requirements, 47 U. 
1
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dictates that health insurers or employers who provide health 
insurance plans for their employees must cover certain preventative 
services for women, including contraceptives at no cost to the patient.
3
  
Federal courts as well as the Supreme Court have grappled with the 
many issues surrounding religious accommodation as it relates to the 




The new wave of religious objections concerning the 
contraceptive mandate involves an accommodation granted to 
religious organizations such as religious hospitals, schools, 
universities and charities, whereby the organizations will be exempt 
from the contraceptive mandate provided they sign the required 
“EBSA 700 Form,”
 5
 a self-certification form that alerts their health 
insurers and/or third-party administrators for their health insurance 
plans of their religious exemption, so that these entities will undertake 
to provide the required contraceptives.
6
 Religious organizations 
around the country have filed suit to oppose the self-certification form, 
alleging that the form violates the First Amendment
7
 and the Religious 
                                                                                                                   
RICH. L. REV. 1301, 1321-24 (2013) (discussing legal challenges to the mandate by 
religious organizations). 
3
 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13 (West 2014); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv); 76 
Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623 (Aug. 3, 2011). 
4
 Compare Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014) (granting an 
injunction pending appeal against enforcing the contraceptive mandate against a 
religious non-profit college and holding that the college need not comply with the 
self-certification requirement to opt out of the contraceptive mandate) with Priests 
For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin enforcement of 
the contraceptive mandate and finding that the self-certification requirement 
allowing religious non-profits to opt-out of the contraceptive mandate was not a 
substantial burden under RFRA). 
5
 EBSA Form 700 – Certification Form for Eligible Organizations, UNITED 
STATES DEP’T OF LABOR, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/healthreform/regulations/coverageofpreventiveservices.htm
l (last visited December 7, 2014) (revised in August 2014). 
6
 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b) (August 27, 2014). 
7
 The First Amendment provides in relevant part: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. 
2
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Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)
8
 by imposing a substantial 
burden on their exercise of religion.
9
  
In University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, Notre Dame, a 
Catholic non-profit university, brought suit against the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) to enjoin enforcement of the 
ACA’s contraceptive mandate requiring the university to provide 
health insurance coverage for contraceptive services for its employees 
and students.
10
 The university’s main argument is that the ACA’s 
contraceptive mandate substantially burdens its free exercise rights 
under the RFRA.
11
 The university specifically sought a preliminary 
injunction exempting it from filling out the required self-certification 
form permitting it to opt out of the contraceptive mandate.
12
 The self-
certification form is a two-page document that allows Notre Dame to 
notify the health insurer for its students and the third-party 
administrator of its health insurance for its employees of the 





 The health insurer and third-party 
administrator would then have to foot the bill and provide 




The district court denied Notre Dame’s request for a 
preliminary injunction, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the lower court’s decision.
16
 In Notre Dame, the Seventh 
Circuit confronted an unprecedented request for preliminary injunction 
                                                                                                                   
CONST. amend. I. The first clause is known as the “Establishment Clause,” and the 
second clause is known as the “Free Exercise Clause.” 
8
 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb et seq. (West 2014). 
9
 Tan, supra note 2. 
10
 743 F.3d 547, 551-54 (7th Cir. 2014).  
11
 Id. at 554. 
12
 Id. at 551, 562. 
13
 Id. at 550-51; EBSA Form 700 – Certification Form for Eligible 
Organizations, supra note 5.  
14
 Id. at 552. 
15
 Id. at 550-51. 
16
 Id. at 551, 562. 
3
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by a religious non-profit that was entitled to an exemption from the 
ACA’s contraceptive mandate but claimed that the accommodation 
itself was a violation of its religious rights under RFRA.
17
 The Seventh 
Circuit held that: (1) the case was not rendered moot by the university 
filling out the self-certification form;
18
 (2) Notre Dame failed to 
establish the likelihood of success on the merits;
19
 and the (3) 
exemption from the certification requirement for religious employers 
did not violate the Establishment Clause.
20
  
This Comment focuses on the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning 
regarding the denial of the preliminary injunction and the likelihood of 
success on the merits for the RFRA claims raised by Notre Dame. The 
Seventh Circuit correctly found that requiring Notre Dame to fill out a 
two-page self-certification form notifying the health insurer for its 
students and the third-party administrator for its self-insured health 
plan for its employees of its religious exemption to the contraceptive 
mandate would not violate Notre Dame’s free exercise rights under the 
RFRA, and therefore, the court affirmed the denial of Notre Dame’s 
request for preliminary injunction.
21
  
In July 2014, the Supreme Court addressed a similar request 
for injunction in Wheaton College v. Burwell, where the Court granted 
Wheaton College’s request for injunction pending appeal and found 
that the Christian college did not have to fill out the self-certification 
form notifying its health plan insurers or third-party health 
administrators of its religious exemption under the ACA.
22
 Justice 
Sotomayor penned a scathing dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg and 
Justice Kagan, quoting heavily from University of Notre Dame v. 
Sebelius and adopting the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning.
23
 The Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Wheaton is a marked departure from free exercise 
                                                 
17
 Id. at 557.  
18
 Id. at 553. 
19
 See id. at 553-60. 
20
 Id. at 560. 
21
 Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 559, 562. 
22
 Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014). 
23
 See id. at 2811-13. 
4
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jurisprudence and religious accommodation. The Wheaton decision 
threatens to swallow the rules for RFRA and for granting injunctions 
by enlarging the religious exemption to the contraceptive mandate to 
an absurd degree. Conversely, the Seventh Circuit correctly decided 
Notre Dame, finding that requiring Notre Dame to fill out the self-
certification form and send it to its health insurer and third-party 
administrator was not a substantial burden on its free exercise rights 
under RFRA.
24
   
Here, the issue is whether requiring Notre Dame and similar 
religious non-profits to fill out the two-page self-certification form and 
send it to its health insurers and/or third-party administrators in order 
to opt-out of providing contraceptive services to its students and 
employees required by the ACA, in and of itself, creates a substantial 
burden on religious rights under RFRA. The answer is no. Requiring a 
religious non-profit like Notre Dame to fill out a simple form and alert 
its health insurer and third-party administrator so it may receive the 
religious accommodation does not violate RFRA but rather strikes the 
perfect balance between respecting the university’s religious rights and 
respecting the rights of Notre Dame students and employees to receive 
free contraceptives, for which they have a statutory right.  
This Comment will discuss the following: (1) the history of the 
RFRA and religious accommodation; (2) the ACA’s contraceptive 
mandate and religious accommodation; (3) the merits of the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Notre Dame; (4) applicable Supreme Court cases 
decided after Notre Dame; and (5) why the Seventh Circuit correctly 
decided Notre Dame. This Comment will argue that the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision was correct because Notre Dame’s claim fails the 
RFRA test and fails under the standard for granting preliminary 
injunctions. 
                                                 
24
 Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 559. 
5
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A. History of the RFRA and Religious Accommodation 
 
Prior to the enactment of the RFRA in 1993, the First 
Amendment provided the only avenue for aggrieved plaintiffs to 
allege violations of their religious rights.
25
 The Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment, which applies to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, states that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof...”
26
 “At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise 
Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all 
religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is 
undertaken for religious reasons.”
27
 
Pre-RFRA, under free exercise jurisprudence, courts used a 
balancing test to determine whether a challenged government action 
violated the First Amendment by taking into account whether the 
challenged action imposed a substantial burden on the practice of 
religion, and if it did, whether the action was needed to serve a 
compelling government interest.
28
 Specifically, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Sherbert v. Verner
29
 and Wisconsin v. Yoder
30
 set forth 
this balancing test to determine whether a challenged government 
action violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
31
 In 
Sherbert, the Court applied this balancing test to hold that an employer 
could not deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist 
                                                 
25
 See generally Mary L. Topliff, J.D., Validity, construction, and application 
of Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb et seq.), 135 A.L.R. 
FED. 121, § 2[a] (originally published in 1996). 
26
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. (emphasis added); Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993). 
27
 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 532. 
28
 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014). 
29
 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
30
 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
31
 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760. 
6
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who was fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath.
32
 In Yoder, the 
Court applied this test to hold that Amish children, who graduated 
eighth grade, did not have to comply with a state law demanding 
compulsory school attendance until the age of 16, which their parents’ 
opposed based on their belief that secondary education conflicts with 
the Amish’s deeply rooted religious beliefs and way of life.
33
  
Three years prior to the enactment of RFRA, in Employment 
Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith,
34
 the Supreme Court had 
all but eliminated the requirement that the government show a 
compelling interest to justify substantial burdens on religious exercise 
imposed by laws neutral toward religion.
35
 Smith rejected the 
compelling interest test set forth in Sherbert.
36
 In Smith, two drug 
counselors who were members of the Native American Church were 
fired for ingesting peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental 
purposes and were denied unemployment benefits on the ground that 
consuming peyote was a crime.
37
 The Oregon Supreme Court applied 
the Sherbert test and held that this denial of unemployment benefits 
violated the Free Exercise Clause.
38
 The Supreme Court vacated the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s decision and remanded to determine whether 
the sacramental use of peyote violated the state drug law.
39
 The 
Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the sacramental use of peyote 
did violate the state’s drug law but nevertheless found that the law 
violated the Free Exercise Clause, and thus, the two drug counselors 
could not be denied unemployment benefits based on ingesting peyote 
for religious purposes.
40
 However, in a heavily criticized decision, the 
Supreme Court reversed, finding that using the Sherbert test in the 
                                                 
32
 374 U.S. at 406, 408-09. 
33
 406 U.S. at 210-11, 234-36. 
34
 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
35
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(a)(4). 
36
 See 494 U.S. at 883-89. 
37
 Id. at 874-75. 
38
 Id. at 875. 
39
 Id. at 875-76. 
40
 Id. at 876. 
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context of generally applicable laws “would open the prospect of 
constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations 
of almost every conceivable kind.”
41
 Consequently, Smith largely 
repudiated the compelling interest test in Sherbert.
42
 In City of Boerne 
v. Flores, the Court noted that Smith held that “neutral, generally 
applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not 
supported by a compelling governmental interest.”
43
 
In order to combat the problematic ruling of Smith, Congress 
enacted the RFRA to provide very broad protection for religious 
freedom.
44
 Congress enacted the RFRA in order to: (1) restore the 
compelling interest test set forth in Sherbert and Yoder; (2) guarantee 
the Act’s application in all cases where free exercise of religion is 
substantially burdened; and (3) provide a claim or defense to 
individuals whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by the 
government.
45
 Significantly, Congress found that “laws ‘neutral’ 
toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws 
intended to interfere with religious exercise.”
46
  
RFRA proscribes the federal government from substantially 
burdening a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results 
from a rule of general applicability unless the government 
demonstrates that the burden as it applies to the person is (1) in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (2) the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.
47
 Although RFRA does not explicitly define personhood, the 
Supreme Court has found that corporations, both non-profits and for-
profits, are considered “people” for the purposes of RFRA.
48
  
                                                 
41
 Id. at 882-83, 888. 
42
 See id. at 883-89. 
43
 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997). 
44
 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760-61 (2014). 
45
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b). See also Topliff, supra note 25. 
46
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(a)(2). See also id. § 2000bb(a)(4). 
47
 See id. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b). See also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761. 
48
 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759, 2768-69. 
8
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As enacted in 1993, RFRA applied to the federal government 
as well as to the States.
49
 In attempting to enforce RFRA against the 
States, Congress invoked its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
50
 However, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress had exceeded its power under Section 5 and 
that RFRA did not apply to the States.
51
 Following the Court’s 
decision in City of Boerne, Congress passed the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),
52
 which 
amended RFRA’s definition of “exercise of religion” and deleted any 
reference to the First Amendment.
53
 § 2000bb-2(4) of RFRA explicitly 
imported the definition of “exercise of religion” from § 2000cc-
5(7)(A) of RLUIPA, which includes “any exercise of religion, whether 
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”
54
 
RFRA was designed to provide more protection for religious liberty 
than is constitutionally required by the First Amendment.
55
 
At the beginning of any RFRA claim, the burden is on the 
plaintiff to show that the challenged government action substantially 
burdens the exercise of religion.
56
 The government substantially 
burdens religion when it puts “substantial pressure on an adherent to 
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”
57
 Under RFRA, a court 
may not determine the centrality of the religious practice to the 
                                                 
49
 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-2(1), § 2000bb-3(a); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2761. 
50
 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761. 
51
 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997). 
52
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc et seq. (West 2014). 
53
 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761-62. 
54
 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-2(4) (RFRA); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) 
(RLUIPA). See also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761-62. 
55
 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767. 
56
 Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 673 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Once a RFRA 
claimant makes a prima facie case that the application of a law or regulation 
substantially burdens his religious practice, the burden shifts to the government to 
justify the burden under strict scrutiny.”). 
57
 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 
(1981). 
9
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adherent’s faith and may not inquire into whether the adherent 
correctly perceived his religious obligations.
58
 However, “[t]he 
religious objection must be both sincere and religious in nature.”
59
 
“Whether a law substantially burdens religious exercise under RFRA 
is a question of law for courts to decide, not a question of fact.”
60
 
After the plaintiff has shown that a government action imposes 
a substantial burden upon his religious practice, the burden shifts to 
the government to show that its action was the least restrictive means 
of furthering a compelling government interest,
 61
 which is also known 
as the strict scrutiny test.
62
 “Congress’s express decision to legislate 
the compelling interest test indicates that RFRA challenges should be 
adjudicated in the same manner as constitutionally mandated 




RFRA has rarely, if ever, been used to challenge a religious 
accommodation process prior to the new wave of cases challenging the 
ACA’s accommodation to the contraceptive mandate. However, the 
closest analogy exists in United States v. Friday, where the Tenth 
Circuit addressed whether the permitting process allowing Native 
Americans to circumvent the ban against killing bald eagles for 
religious purposes violated the RFRA.
64
 In Friday, a member of the 
Northern Arapaho Tribe of Wyoming had been charged with killing a 
bald eagle for use in a religious ceremony without a permit in violation 




 Korte, 735 F.3d at 683. 
60
 Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 247 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 
61
 Korte, 735 F.3d at 673 (citing Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente 
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 (2006)). 
62
 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 
(1993) (finding that to satisfy the strict scrutiny test for laws restricting religious 
practice, the law must advance a compelling government interest and be narrowly 
tailored to pursue that interest).  
63
 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 430. 
64
 525 F.3d 938, 942 (10th Cir. 2008). 
10
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of the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act.
65
 Congress and the Fish 
and Wildlife Service (FWS) accommodate Native Americans through 
a permitting process which allows them to take a live eagle for 
religious purposes provided they are members of a federally-
recognized tribe and they write to the Migratory Bird Permit Office 
describing how many eagles they wish to take and for what tribe and 
ceremony they are needed.
66
 The FWS will grant an application for 
such a permit only if it determines the taking is compatible with the 
preservation of the eagle.
67
 Mr. Friday argued that the permitting 
process was a substantial burden on his religious practice in violation 
of RFRA.
68
 The court was skeptical that the bare requirement of 
obtaining a permitting in order to be granted this accommodation can 
constitute a substantial burden under RFRA.
69
 The court found that the 
permitting process was valid under RFRA because it was the least 
restrictive means of pursuing the compelling government interest in 
preserving bald eagles.
70
 The Tenth Circuit aptly recognized that: 
 
By enacting a law banning the taking of eagles and then 
permitting religious exceptions, the government has 
tried to accommodate Native American religions while 
still achieving its compelling interests. That 
accommodation may be more burdensome than the 
Northern Arapaho would prefer, and may sometimes 
subordinate their interests to other policies not of their 
choosing. Law accommodates religion; it cannot 




                                                 
65
 Id.  
66




 Id. at 946-47. 
69
 Id. at 947. 
70
 Id. at 942. 
71
 Id. at 960 (emphasis added).  
11
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In a major Seventh Circuit RFRA case, Korte v. Sebelius,
72
 
upon which Notre Dame heavily relies, the Seventh Circuit addressed 
whether two for-profit corporations who provided health plans for 
their employees could refuse to comply with the contraceptive 
mandate based upon the Catholic beliefs of their owners.
 73
 The court 
ordered the district court to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining 
enforcement of the contraceptive mandate against the employers.
74
 
Notre Dame’s reliance on Korte is misplaced because the Korte court 
never addressed the issue of religious non-profits, who are already 
provided an accommodation to the contraceptive mandate, but rather 
the rights of for-profit religious objectors who were not provided an 
accommodation to the contraceptive mandate.
75
 As the district court in 
Notre Dame stated, this distinction is notable as Notre Dame is in a 
completely different position than the plaintiffs in Korte.
76
 On appeal, 
the Seventh Circuit noted that because Notre Dame is eligible for the 
accommodation, Notre Dame will be in the same position that the 
employers in Korte were pending resolution of their case – “fully 
entitled to thumb its nose at the contraceptive regulation,” despite 




B. The ACA and the Contraceptive Mandate 
 
The ACA was enacted under the Obama administration in an 
effort to combat the social evil concerning the millions of Americans 
who were uninsured or without adequate health insurance by making 
healthcare more affordable and accessible to the American people.
78
 
                                                 
72
 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013). 
73






 Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 912, 918 (N.D. Ind. 
December 20, 2013) (citing Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2013). 
77
 Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 558. 
78
 Whitney Morrissey, Obamacare’s Employer-Shared Responsibility 
Provision: The Impact on Employers and Employees, 7 PHOENIX L. REV. 103, 103-
04 (2013). 
12
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The ACA was a complete overhaul of the American healthcare 
system.
79
 “Some key features of the ACA include the following: 
consumer protections that eliminate lifetime dollar limits; coverage for 
preventative services to avoid illnesses; coverage for individuals with 
pre-existing conditions; coverage for children under their parent(s) 




One of the most controversial and highly criticized provisions 
of the ACA is the “contraceptive mandate,” which requires group 
health plans to provide coverage for preventative care and screenings 
for women, which includes “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration 
approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient 
education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity” 
without cost-sharing.
81
 Congress authorized the Health Resources and 
Services Administration (HRSA), a component of HHS, to determine 
what would be covered under the contraceptive mandate.
82
 The HRSA 
consulted with the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to determine what 
preventative services would be included under the contraceptive 
mandate.
83
 The IOM recommended covering all FDA-approved 
contraceptive services for women after finding that these preventative 
services are necessary for the health and well being of women, and the 
HRSA promulgated the Women’s Preventative Services Guidelines.
84
 
                                                 
79
 Vinita Andrapalliyal, “Healthcare for All”? The Gap Between Rhetoric and 
Reality in the Affordable Care Act, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58, 70 (2013) 
(“The ACA was an unprecedented overhaul of our nation’s healthcare system.”). 
80
 Morrissey, supra note 78, at 104. 
81
 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (West 2014); HEALTH RESOURCES AND 
SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Women’s Preventative Services Guidelines, available at 
http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited December 8, 2014). See also 26 
C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713(a)(1)(iv) (August 1, 2013); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-
2713(a)(1)(iv) (August 1, 2013); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (March 31, 2014); 77 
Fed. Reg. 8725 (February 15, 2012).  
82




 HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Women’s 
Preventative Services Guidelines, supra note 81. See also 77 Fed. Reg. 8725-8726 
(February 15, 2012). 
13
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“FDA-approved contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures 
include intrauterine devices (IUDs), the morning-after pill (Plan B), 
and Ulipristal (Ella), all of which can induce an abortion.”
85
 
Failure to comply with the ACA comes at a steep price. If an 
employer fails to comply with the ACA’s group health plan 
requirements, it will be forced to pay $100 per day for each affected 
“individual.”
86
 Also, if the employer stops providing health insurance 
entirely and at least one full-time employee enrolls in a health plan and 
qualifies for a subsidy on one of the government-run ACA exchanges, 





1. Exemptions and Accommodations 
 
In recognition of religious objections to the contraceptive 
mandate, HRSA established an exemption to the contraceptive 
mandate for religious employers.
88
 “[A] ‘religious employer’ is an 
organization that is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity and is 
referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, as amended.”
89
 Exempt religious employers include 
“churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations 




At first, under the religious employer exemption, “the 
definition of ‘religious employer’ was so circumscribed that it left out 
religious colleges and universities; religious hospitals and clinics; 
religious charities and social-service organizations; other faith-based 
                                                 
85
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, No. 14-392, 
2014 WL 4978601, at *2 (Oct. 3, 2014).   
86
 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 4980D(a)-(b) (West 2014); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762. 
87
 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 4980H (a), (c)(1); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762.  
88
 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (August 27, 2014); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2763. 
89
 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a). 
90
 26 U.S.C.A. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii) (West 2014). 
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nonprofits; and for-profit, closely held businesses managed in 
accordance with a religious mission or creed.”
91
 In response to 
backlash from religious non-profit organizations that did not fall 
within the definition of a “religious employer” for purposes of the 
exemption, HHS first offered a temporary “safe harbor” for certain 
left-out religious non-profit organizations
92
 and then eventually 
promulgated new regulations granting religious non-profit 
organizations an accommodation from the contraceptive mandate.
93
 
However, the regulations did not provide a complete exemption akin 
to the exemption granted to “religious employers,” but rather granted 
religious organizations an accommodation allowing them to opt out of 
the contraceptive mandate provided that: 
  
(1) The organization opposes providing coverage for 
some or all of any contraceptive services required to be 
covered under § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) on account of 
religious objections. 
 
(2) The organization is organized and operates as a 
nonprofit entity. 
 
(3) The organization holds itself out as a religious 
organization. 
 
(4) The organization self-certifies, in a form and 
manner specified by the Secretary, that it satisfies the 
criteria in paragraphs (b)(1) through (3) of this section, 
and makes such self-certification available for 
examination upon request by the first day of the first 
plan year to which the accommodation in paragraph (c) 
of this section applies. The self-certification must be 
                                                 
91
 Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 661 (7th Cir. 2013). 
92
 Id. at 661-62 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 8728 (February 15, 2012)). 
93
 See 26 C.F.R. 54.9815-2713A(a); 29 C.F.R. 2590.715-2713A(a); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 147.131(b). 
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executed by a person authorized to make the 
certification on behalf of the organization, and must be 
maintained in a manner consistent with the record 
retention requirements under section 107 of the 




In order to receive the accommodation, religious organizations 
that meet the requirements of 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)(1)-(3) must 
comply with the self-certification requirement.
95
 The EBSA Form 700 
is a two-page self-certification form that allows “eligible 
organizations,” i.e. religious non-profit organizations, to opt out of the 





 The accommodation provides that 
when the religious organization notifies the group health insurance 
issuer and/or third-party administrator (for self-insured plans) of its 
exemption, the issuer or third-party administrator must then exclude 
contraceptive coverage from the employer’s health plan and provide 
separate payments for the required contraceptive services for plan 
participants without imposing any cost-sharing upon the religious 
organization, its health insurance plan or its employee beneficiaries.
98
   
 In August 2014, following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wheaton College v. Burwell, the accommodation was revised to 
provide additional notice options for religious organizations.
99
 Now, 
                                                 
94
 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b). 
95
 See id. § 147.131(b)(4). 
96
 EBSA Form 700 – Certification Form for Eligible Organizations, supra note 
5. 
97
 Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2014). 
98
 Id. § 147.131(c); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2763 (2014). See also EBSA Form 700 – Certification Form for Eligible 
Organizations, supra note 5. 
99
 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c); 79 Fed. Reg. 51092 (August 27, 2014); 
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, Women’s Preventative Services 
Coverage and Non-Profit Religious Organizations, available at 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/womens-preven-
02012013.html (last visited December 9, 2014).  
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an eligible religious organization can either notify its group health plan 
issuer and/or third-party administrator for self-insured plans using the 
self-certification form or it can notify HHS in writing of its religious 
objections to the contraceptive mandate.
100
 The effect of this change is 
that if HHS is notified instead of the group health plan issuer and/or 
third-party administrator, HHS will then have to (1) inform the group 
health plan issuer and/or third-party administrator that it received 
notice of the eligible religious organization’s objections to the 
contraceptive mandate and (2) describe to the issuer and/or third-party 
administrator its duties under 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c).
101
 In the 
alternative form of notice, HHS acts as a middle man between the 
religious organization and its group health plan issuer and/or third-
party administrator, but the duties of the issuer or third-party 
administrator to provide the contraceptive coverage at no cost to the 
employees and beneficiaries covered under the employer’s group 
health plan remain the same under either form of notification. Either 
form of notification relieves Notre Dame of the duty to pay for and 
provide contraceptive services that it finds morally objectionable.  
The self-certification form was revised in August 2014 to 
reflect the new notification requirements.
 102
 The revised form differs 
from the form that Notre Dame and the many religious organizations 
who filed suit prior to issuance of the new form were required to fill 
out because the new form allows religious organizations to provide 
notice of religious objections to the contraceptive mandate either to 
their group health insurance issuers or third-party administrators via 
the self-certification form or alternatively provide notice to the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services.
103
  
Also, in August 2014, following the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., HHS issued proposed rules 
soliciting comments on expanding the accommodation to include 
                                                 
100
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certain closely held for-profit corporations who have religious 
objections to the contraceptive mandate.
104
  
The contraceptive mandate accommodation provided to 
religious organizations did not sit well with most religious 
organizations who felt that being required to “self-certify” and notify a 
health insurer or third-party administrator of their religious exemption 
so that these entities could provide the mandated contraceptives, which 
they found morally objectionable, to their employees and/or students 
was not an accommodation at all but rather a substantial burden on 
their free exercise rights under RFRA and the First Amendment.
105
 
Religious organizations believe that the government should provide 
them with a complete exemption like religious employers, who are not 
required to self-certify or provide, directly or indirectly through a 
third-party, contraceptive coverage for their employees and/or 
students.
106
 Religious non-profits flooded the courts with lawsuits, 
seeking to enjoin enforcement of the contraceptive mandate and 
requesting preliminary injunctions against the self-certification 
requirement on First Amendment and RFRA grounds.
107
 
Aside from the ACA exemptions and accommodations 
provided to religious employers and organizations, the ACA exempts 
many other employers from most of the ACA’s provisions.
108
 For 
example, “grandfathered health plans,” i.e. plans existing prior to 
March 23, 2010, that have not made specified changes after that date, 
do not have to comply with many of the ACA requirements including 
                                                 
104
 See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, Women’s 
Preventative Services Coverage and Non-Profit Religious Organizations, supra note 
99 (discussing the proposed approaches for defining a closely held for-profit 
organization who has a religious objection to the contraceptive mandate). 
105
 See, e.g., Zubik v. Sebelius, 983 F. Supp. 2d 576, 603-06 (W.D. Pa. 2013). 
106
 See id. at 606-08. 
107
 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 85, at *11, * n.1. See also 
THE BECKET FUND, HHS Mandate Information Central, available at 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited December 9, 2014) 
and cases cited therein. 
108
 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2763-64 (2014). 
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 Additionally, employers with less than 
50 employees are not required to provide health insurance at all.
110
 As 
the Supreme Court has noted, the contraceptive mandate currently 




2. Religious Objections to the Contraceptive Mandate and 
the Self-Certification Form 
 
Many religious employers and organizations across the country 
object to the contraceptive mandate on the ground that it violates the 
tenets of their faith.
112
 While there are many religious objections to the 
mandate espoused by various religious groups, the Catholic Church’s 
condemnation of the mandate is pertinent to the Notre Dame decision 
as the university adheres to Catholic doctrine. Catholic doctrine holds 
that human life is sacred and forbids the use of contraceptives, finding 
that they are unlawful methods of birth control that artificially 
interfere with procreation.
113
 Catholic teaching prohibits “any action 
which either before, at the moment of, or after sexual intercourse, is 
specifically intended to prevent procreation—whether as an end or as a 
means.”
114
 The Catholic Church believes in “the sanctity of human life 
from conception to natural death and the moral wrongfulness of 




Before the rules requiring coverage of all FDA-approved 
contraceptive methods without cost sharing were even issued, the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops opposed the proposal, 
                                                 
109
 42 U.S.C.A. § 18011(a), (e) (West 2014); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764. 
110
 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H(c)(2) (West 2014); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764. 
111
 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764. 
112
 See Tan, supra note 2. 
113






 See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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stating that the contraceptive mandate is a violation of the First 
Amendment and RFRA.
116
 The Bishops continued to oppose the 
contraceptive mandate after the rules were finalized, arguing that the 
mandate severely burdens the conscience of religious objectors and 
that rescission of the mandate is the only complete solution but that in 
the alternative, the government should expand the religious employer 
exemption to bring more religious objectors within the exemption’s 
purview.
117
 Cardinal Timothy M. Dolan, head of the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, also condemned the government’s 
proffered “accommodation,” which allows religious non-profit 
organizations to opt out of the contraceptive mandate by alerting its 
group health plan issuers and/or third party administrators of their 
religious exemption so that these entities can provide the required 
contraceptive coverage, which they find morally objectionable, for the 
religious non-profits’ employees and/or students, stating that: 
 
It appears to offer second-class status to our first-class 
institutions in Catholic health care, Catholic education 
and Catholic charities. HHS offers what it calls an 
‘accommodation’ rather than accepting the fact that 
these ministries are integral to our church and worthy 




                                                 
116
 Lisa C. Ikemoto, Abortion, Contraception and the ACA: The Realignment 
of Women’s Health, 55 HOW. L.J. 731, 764-66, 766 n.248  (2012) (citing News 
Release, UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Bishops’ Pro-Life 
Chair Strongly Opposes Recommended Mandate for Birth Control, Sterilization in 
Private Health Plans (July 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.usccb.org/news/2011/11-143.cfm). 
117
 See News Release, UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, 
Bishops Renew Call to Legislative Action on Religious Liberty (February 10, 2012), 
available at http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/12-026.cfm. 
118
 See News Release, UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, 
HHS Proposal Falls Short in Meeting Church Concerns; Bishops Look Forward to 
Addressing Issues with Administration (February 7, 2013), available at 
http://www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-037.cfm (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Religious non-profits, like Notre Dame, do not want to take 
part either directly or indirectly in the provision of these contraceptive 
services and believe that being required to fill out the self-certification 
form and alert their group health plan issuers or third party-
administrators of their religious exemption to the contraceptive 
mandate authorizes these entities to provide the contraceptive services, 
thereby making them complicit in providing contraceptives which they 
find morally objectionable.
119
 Many religious non-profits have filed 
suit complaining that the contraceptive mandate violates their free 
exercise rights under the First Amendment and RFRA and have 
requested a preliminary injunction against the self-certification 
requirement pending resolution of their cases, with the majority of the 
district courts granting these requests.
120
 However, the Sixth, Seventh 
and D.C. Circuits have sustained the accommodation and denied such 
injunctive relief finding that the respective plaintiffs did not meet their 
burden to show the likelihood of success on the merits on their RFRA 
and First Amendment claims.
121
 According to the Becket Fund, there 
are currently 54 non-profit lawsuits pending in the courts regarding the 
contraceptive mandate in which 32 injunctions were granted and five 
were denied.
122
 Of the five cases where the court denied an injunction, 
one was the instant case from the Seventh Circuit, two were cases 
from the D.C. Circuit (on consolidated appeal), and two were cases 
from the Sixth Circuit (on consolidated appeal).
123
 
                                                 
119
 See, e.g., Zubik v. Sebelius, 983 F. Supp. 2d 576, 604-06 (W.D. Pa. 2013). 
120
 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 85, at *11, * n.1. See also 
THE BECKET FUND, HHS Mandate Information Central, available at 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited December 9, 2014). 
121
 See Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 
(D.C. Cir. 2014); Michigan Catholic Conf. & Catholic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 755 
F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2014); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 
2014).  
122
 THE BECKET FUND, HHS Mandate Information Central, available at 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited December 9, 2014) 
(citing Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014); Michigan Catholic Conf. & Catholic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 
372 (6th Cir. 2014); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014)). 
123
 Id.  
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C. Standard for Preliminary Injunctions 
 
A preliminary injunction is “an injunction that is issued to 
protect [a] plaintiff from irreparable injury and to preserve the court’s 
power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits.”
124
 
Preliminary injunctions do not involve a final determination on the 
merits because the purpose of a preliminary injunction is not to 
determine controverted rights but rather to “prevent a threatened 
wrong or any further perpetration of injury, or the doing of any act 
pending the final determination of the action whereby rights may be 
threatened or endangered, and to maintain things in the condition in 
which they are in at the time … until the issues can be determined 
after a full hearing.”
125
  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides courts with the 
power to issue preliminary injunctions.
126
 Although Rule 65 discusses 
“collateral requirements of notice, duration, form, and security,” it 
“leaves the threshold questions of whether and when a preliminary 
injunction should issue to the discretion of the courts in accordance 
with traditional principles of equity.”
127
 As the Seventh Circuit has 




Furthermore, “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary 
remedy never awarded as of right.”
129
 As the Supreme Court has 
                                                 
124
 11A A. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, M. KANE, R. MARCUS, AND A. STEINMAN, 
FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2947 (3d ed. 2014). 
125
 Id. (quoting Benson Hotel Corp. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 694, 696 (8th Cir. 
1948)). 
126
 FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
127
 Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 109, 110 (2001). 
128
 Advent Electronics, Inc. v. Buckman, 112 F.3d 267, 274 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(citing Hoosier Penn Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil Co., 934 F.2d 882, 884-85 (7th Cir. 
1991)). 
129
 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing 
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-690 (2008)).  
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noted, “[i]t frequently is observed that a preliminary injunction is an 
extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted 
unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of 
persuasion.”
130
 Thus, this type of injunctive relief should be rare. 
In Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., the Supreme 
Court established that: “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction 
must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 
that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 
the public interest.”
131
 Following Winter, a circuit split developed 
concerning whether sliding-scale preliminary injunction tests survived 
the Court’s decision in Winter.
132
 However, the Seventh Circuit’s 
sliding-scale analysis, which will be explained below, applies to the 
Notre Dame case and will serve as the basis for the argument that 
Notre Dame’s claim fails under the standard for preliminary 
injunctions.  
Under the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, in order to win a 
preliminary injunction, the moving party must show that it has “no 
adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable harm if a 
preliminary injunction is denied” and that there is “some likelihood of 
success on the merits.”
133
 “If the moving party meets this threshold 
burden, the court weighs the competing harms to the parties if an 
injunction is granted or denied and also considers the public 
interest.”
134
 This equitable balancing occurs on a sliding-scale – “the 
greater the likelihood of success on the merits, the less heavily the 
                                                 
130
 Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (quoting 
11A A. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, M. KANE, R. MARCUS, AND A. STEINMAN, FED. PRAC. 
& PROC. CIV. § 2948 (3d ed. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
131
 Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
132
 Rachel A. Weisshaar, Hazy Shades of Winter: Resolving the Circuit Split 
over Preliminary Injunctions, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1032-1048 (2012) (discussing 
the circuit split regarding sliding-scale preliminary injunction tests after Winter). 
133
 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2011). 
134
 Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Planned 
Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 
972 (7th Cir. 2012) and Ezell, 651 F.3d at 694). 
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balance of harms must tip in the moving party’s favor.”
135
 The goal of 
this balancing is to minimize the costs of a wrong decision.
136
  
A district court’s grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is 
an appealable interlocutory order.
137
 The standard of review for an 
appeal from an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction is 
abuse of discretion.
138
 It is important to note that given the 
interlocutory nature of such an appeal, a court of appeals’ review of a 
grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is limited to determining 
whether there was an abuse of discretion, and the court’s opinions 
regarding the likelihood of success on the merits should not to be 





II. UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME V. SEBELIUS 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
The University of Notre Dame is a Catholic non-profit 
university with approximately 11,000 students and 5,200 
employees.
140
 Notre Dame provides health benefits to both its students 
and employees.
141
 The university self-insures its employees’ medical 
                                                 
135
 Korte, 735 F.3d at 665 (citing Planned Parenthood, 699 F.3d at 972). 
136
 Korte, 735 F.3d at 665 (citing Stuller, Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., Inc., 
695 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir. 2012). 
137
 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a)(1) (West 2014) (granting the courts of appeals 
jurisdiction to review appeals from “interlocutory orders of the district courts . . . 
granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to 
dissolve or modify injunctions”). 
138
 See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 
U.S. 418, 428 (2006) (“We review the District Court’s legal rulings de novo and its 
ultimate decision to issue the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.”); 
Goodman v. Illinois Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Regulation, 430 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 
2005) (“A district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.”). 
139
 See Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2014). 
140
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expenses but a third-party administrator, Meritain Health, Inc., 
administers the employee health plan without providing any insurance 
coverage.
142
 Notre Dame also has a contract with Aetna (Meritain’s 
parent company) that gives its students the option of obtaining health 
insurance from Aetna.
143
 Meritain administers coverage for 
approximately 4,600 Notre Dame employees, while Aetna insures 
about 2,600 students and 100 dependents.
144
 Notre Dame adheres to 
Catholic doctrine, which prohibits the use of contraceptives.
145
 As 
such, Notre Dame has never paid for contraceptives for its employees 
or allowed Aetna to insure Notre Dame students for the expense of 
contraceptives under the university’s health plan.
146
  
 Shortly after the enactment of the ACA, the government 
created an administrative regulation that provided an accommodation 
to the contraceptive mandate for religious organizations that objected 
based on their religious beliefs.
147
 At the time, the regulation did not 
exempt Catholic institutions, like Notre Dame, that incorporated as 
non-profits rather than religious institutions.
148
 Thus, before the 
accommodation was created for religious employers, Notre Dame was 
required to provide contraceptives to its students and employees under 
the regulations despite its religious objections. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
In 2012, Notre Dame filed an initial lawsuit claiming that the 
ACA’s contraceptive mandate infringed its free exercise rights under 










 Id.  
147
 Id. at 549-550. 
148
 Id. at 550. 
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the First Amendment and RFRA.
 149
  However, the suit was dismissed 
for standing and ripeness, as the government promised that Notre 
Dame would not have to comply with the regulations for one year 
because new regulations would be issued during this time period, 
which would expand the exemption to the contraceptive mandate.
150
 
As promised, new regulations were added to provide an exemption 
from the contraceptive mandate to include Catholic non-profit 
organizations such as Notre Dame.
151
 In order for Notre Dame to opt-
out of the contraceptive mandate, it need only fill out the EBSA Form 
700 self-certification, stating its religious exemption, and send copies 
to Meritain and Aetna.
152
 Under the ACA, both Aetna, as a health 
insurance provider, and Meritain, as a third-party administrator of 
Notre Dame’s self-insured plan, are required to pay for contraceptives 
for women with no cost sharing.
153
 The self-certification form alerts 
Aetna and Meritain that Notre Dame will not pay for contraceptive 
services and that therefore they must pay.
154
 Under the regulations, 
Aetna and Meritain are required to inform Notre Dame’s female 
employees and students that they will be covering their contraceptive 
costs.
155
 Also, under the regulations, the government will reimburse 
Meritain at least 110% of its costs and Aetna can recoup costs from 
savings on pregnancy medical care.
156
 If Notre Dame failed to comply 
with these regulations, it would be subject to hefty fines, which the 
Seventh Circuit estimated would be approximately $685,000 per day, 
assuming half of the 13,700 covered employees, students and 
dependents are women, which would total $250 million per year; if 
                                                 
149
 See Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 3:12CV253RLM, 2012 WL 
6756332, at *3-4 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012), appeal dismissed (July 26, 2013) 
(dismissing Notre Dame’s case for ripeness and standing). 
150




 Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)(4)). 
153
 Id. at 550 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(2)(i)(B), (ii); 29 C.F.R. § 
2590.715-2713A(b)(3)). 
154
 Id. at 550. 
155
 Id. at 551. 
156
 Id. at 550-51. 
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Notre Dame dropped its employee health plan, the penalty would be 




Although the new regulations were promulgated in July 2013, 
Notre Dame did not file its second lawsuit until December 3, 2013, 
even though the deadline for these regulations went into effect January 
1, 2014; however, the student health plan under Aetna had until 
August 2014 to comply.
158
 Less than a week after filing its second 
lawsuit, Notre Dame moved for entry of a preliminary injunction 
seeking to enjoin enforcement of the contraceptive mandate and 
challenging the self-certification form allowing it to opt-out of 
providing contraceptive coverage on First Amendment and RFRA 
grounds, which the district court denied on December 20.
159
 In 
denying Notre Dame’s request for preliminary injunction, the district 
court aptly noted that: 
 
Notre Dame wants to eat its cake, and have it still, at 
the expense of Congress, administrative agencies, and 
the employees who will be affected. Notre Dame is free 
to opt out of providing the coverage itself, but it can’t 
stop anyone else from providing it. But that is 
essentially what Notre Dame is requesting. Notre Dame 
is not being asked to do or say anything it doesn’t 
already do, and wouldn’t do regardless of the outcome 
of this case; the only thing that changes under the 
healthcare law is the actions of third parties. Notre 
Dame can’t claim to be “pressured” to do something it 
has done, will do, and would do regardless of the 
contraception requirement. If Notre Dame opts out of 
providing contraceptive coverage, as it always has and 
likely would going forward, it is the government who 
                                                 
157
 Id. at 552. 
158
 Id. at 551. 
159
 Id.; See Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Ind. 
December 20, 2013). 
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will authorize the third party to pay for contraception. 
The government isn’t violating Notre Dame’s right to 
free exercise of religion by letting it opt out, or by 




Notre Dame appealed the denial of its preliminary injunction 
the same day.
161
 With the January 1 deadline looming, on December 
31, the last day before Notre Dame would be penalized for violating 
the HHS regulations, Notre Dame signed the self-certification form 
and thereby opted out of paying for contraceptive coverage for its 
employees.
162




The district court stayed all proceedings pending the Seventh 
Circuit’s review of the appeal from the denial of Notre Dame’s request 
for preliminary injunction.
164
 On February 21, 2014, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary 
injunction,
165
 and denied a rehearing en banc on May 7, 2014. On 
October 3, 2014, Notre Dame filed its petition for writ of certiorari to 
the Supreme Court, asking the Court to reverse and remand the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in light of the Court’s decisions in Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Wheaton College v. Burwell, which 





                                                 
160
 Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 912, 914-15 (N.D. Ind. 
December 20, 2013).  
161




 Id. at 552. 
164
 Id. at 551. 
165
 Id. at 562. 
166
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 85, at *1.   
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C. Majority Opinion 
 
At the outset, Judge Posner, writing for the 2-1 majority, which 
Judge Hamilton joined, was “puzzled” by Notre Dame’s request for 
injunctive relief.
167
 The court pondered: “what does Notre Dame want 
us to do?”
168
 Notre Dame had already complied with the ACA and 
sent copies of its self-certification form to both Aetna and Meritain.
169
 
The Seventh Circuit imagined that Notre Dame would want the court 
to order Aetna and Meritain to stop providing contraceptive coverage 
to Notre Dame students and employees pending resolution of this case 
in the district court.
170
 However, the court stated that it could not issue 
such an order as Aetna and Meritain were not joined as defendants and 
noted that “while a religious institution has a broad immunity from 
being required to engage in acts that violate the tenets of its faith, it 
has no right to prevent other institutions, whether the government or a 
health insurance company, from engaging in acts that merely offend 
the institution.”
171
 The court also noted that because the nature of this 
appeal was interlocutory, the issue before the court was only whether 
the district court abused its discretion when it denied Notre Dame’s 
request for preliminary injunction.
172
  
First, since the Seventh Circuit could not figure out what kind 
of preliminary relief Notre Dame wanted, the court could not make a 
determination that Notre Dame will suffer irreparable harm if the court 
affirms the denial of its preliminary injunction, as required under the 
preliminary injunction standard.
173
 Second, under the preliminary 
                                                 
167
 Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 552 (questioning what exactly Notre Dame wants 
enjoined at this stage of the litigation as it had already filled out the self-certification 
form and sent it to Aetna and Meritain, thus complying with the ACA albeit under 
duress). 
168






 Id. (citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 
439, 450-51 (1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986)). 
172
 Id. at 551-52. 
173
 Id. at 554. 
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injunction test’s second prong, the court found that Notre Dame failed 




This Comment only discusses the likelihood of success on 
Notre Dame’s RFRA claims, which comprise its main arguments, and 
therefore does not discuss the Seventh Circuit’s holding regarding 
Notre Dame’s First Amendment arguments. Notre Dame’s main claim 
is that requiring the university to fill out the self-certification form and 
send copies to Aetna and Meritain in order to opt out of the 
contraceptive mandate imposes a substantial burden upon its religious 
exercise under RFRA and that no compelling government interest 
justifies this burden.
175
 Notre Dame’s main RFRA arguments are as 
follows: (1) the self-certification form “triggers” Meritain’s and 
Aetna’s coverage of contraceptives to its employees and students 
thereby making Notre Dame an accomplice in the provision of 
contraceptive coverage in violation of Catholic doctrine;
176
 (2) 
alternatively, if the form is not a “trigger,” then Notre Dame’s health 
plans are the “conduit” through which its employees and students 
receive contraceptive coverage, which makes Notre Dame complicit in 
sin;
177
 and (3) the contraceptive regulation forces Notre Dame to 
identify and contract with a third party willing to provide the 
contraceptive coverage it finds morally objectionable.
178
  
The Seventh Circuit sharply rejected Notre Dame’s argument 
that requiring it to fill out the self-certification form and send copies to 
Aetna and Meritain in order to opt out of the contraceptive mandate 
was a “substantial burden” under RFRA and premised its holding on 
Notre Dame’s failure to show a substantial burden under RFRA 
without delving into the strict scrutiny test.
179
 The Seventh Circuit 
emphasized the novelty of Notre Dame’s claim, which essentially 
                                                 
174




 Id. at 554. 
177




 See id. at 554-59. 
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argues that Notre Dame has a right to the exemption from the ACA’s 
contraceptive mandate without having to ask for it.
180
 The court stated 
that this case and cases like it are paradoxical and virtually 
unprecedented because “the beneficiaries of the religious exemption 
are claiming that the exemption process itself imposes a substantial 
burden on their religious faiths.”
181
 The court also noted that the 
regulations at issue seek an accommodation between the secular 
interests motivating the contraceptive mandate to provide these 
services to women free of charge and the interests of religious 
institutions that provide health services.
182
 
Turning to the merits of Notre Dame’s RFRA claim, the 
Seventh Circuit first addressed and rejected Notre Dame’s “trigger” 
theory, which states that the self-certification form “triggers” 
Meritain’s and Aetna’s coverage of contraceptives to its employees 
and students thereby making Notre Dame an accomplice in the 
provision of contraceptive coverage in violation of Catholic 
doctrine.
183
 The court rejected the idea that the self-certification form 
“enables” the provision of contraceptive coverage, stating that 
“[f]ederal law, not the religious organization’s signing and mailing the 
form, requires health-care insurers, along with third-party 
administrators of self-insured health plans, to cover contraceptive 
services,” and “[b]y refusing to fill out the form Notre Dame would 
subject itself to penalties, but Aetna and Meritain would still be 
required by federal law to provide the services to the university’s 
students and employees unless and until their contractual relation with 
Notre Dame terminated.”
184
 The court noted that signing the form and 
sending it to Meritain reminds Meritain of its obligation under the law 
to pick up the tab if Notre Dame invokes its right to opt out of the 
                                                 
180




 Id. at 551. 
183
 See id. at 554-57. 
184
 Id. at 554. 
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contraceptive mandate and merely shifts the financial burden from 
Notre Dame to the government.
185
  
The court then provided examples to expose the fallacy of 
Notre Dame’s “trigger” theory.
186
 First, the court hypothesized that if 
the U.S. had a single-payer healthcare system (a system where the 
government paid the costs of covered medical care) and the 
government fully covered the costs of contraceptives, then Notre 
Dame would not object on religious grounds because the government 
would be directly providing the contraceptives.
187
 The main difference 
between the single-payer system and the system under the ACA is that 
under the ACA, the government does not directly provide the 
contraceptive coverage but rather uses private health insurers and 
health plan administrators as its agents to provide the services, 
subsidized by the government.
188
 The court surmised that if the 
government is entitled to require female contraceptives to be provided 
free of cost, then it struggles to see how Notre Dame’s signature on the 
self-certification form, declaring its exemption from providing 
contraceptive coverage, and its mailing of this form to Aetna and 
Meritain, who are required under federal law to provide such 
coverage, in any way triggers the provision of contraceptives.
189
  The 
court then provided another example to discredit the trigger theory: 
 
Consider this further example illustrative of our doubts. 
Suppose it is wartime, there is a draft, and a Quaker is 
called up. Many Quakers are pacifists, and their 
pacifism is a tenet of their religion. Suppose the Quaker 
who's been called up tells the selective service system 
that he’s a conscientious objector. The selective service 
officer to whom he makes this pitch accepts the 
sincerity of his refusal to bear arms and excuses him. 
                                                 
185
 Id. at 555. 
186
 See id. at 555-57. 
187
 Id. at 555-56. 
188
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But as the Quaker leaves the selective service office, 
he's told: “you know this means we'll have to draft 
someone in place of you”—and the Quaker replies 
indignantly that if the government does that, it will be 
violating his religious beliefs. Because his religion 
teaches that no one should bear arms, drafting another 
person in his place would make him responsible for the 
military activities of his replacement, and by doing so 
would substantially burden his own sincere religious 
beliefs. Would this mean that by exempting him the 
government had forced him to “trigger” the drafting of 
a replacement who was not a conscientious objector, 
and that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act would 
require a draft exemption for both the Quaker and his 
non-Quaker replacement? That seems a fantastic 
suggestion. Yet confronted with this hypothetical at the 
oral argument, Notre Dame’s counsel acknowledged its 
applicability and said that drafting a replacement 




The Seventh Circuit stated that if Notre Dame refused to sign 
the form while still adhering to its long-standing policy of not paying 
for contraceptives, its female employees and students would still have 
a federal right to free contraceptive services from Meritain and Aetna 
unless Norte Dame dropped its student health plan entirely.
191
 Finally, 
the court found that the trigger theory is flawed because the form 
provides an accommodation for Notre Dame that allows the university 
to wash its hands of any involvement in the provision of contraceptive 
services by requiring Aetna and Meritain, under compulsion of federal 
law, to provide the services.
192
 Notre Dame tells Aetna and Meritain 
that it has an exemption from the contraceptive mandate, and in turn, 






 Id. at 557. 
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the government tells Aetna and Meritain that they are not exempt from 
the contraceptive coverage.
193
 The Seventh Circuit equated the self-
certification form to a warning rather than a trigger, noting that “[t]he 




Second, the Seventh Circuit rejected Notre Dame’s “conduit” 
theory, which states that the contraceptive mandate accommodation 
makes Notre Dame complicit in facilitating contraceptive coverage to 
its students and employees, which violates its religious beliefs.
195
 The 
court quickly dismissed this argument by citing Notre Dame’s 
counsel’s admission at oral arguments that Notre Dame would have no 
problem if each of its female employees signed and mailed a form to 
Meritain and each of its female students signed and mailed a form to 
Aetna, stating that they have insurance through Notre Dame, who will 
not cover contraceptives, and thus these entities must cover them.
196
 
The court did not see how this type of “opt-in” form would make 
Notre Dame’s health plan any less of a “conduit.”
197
  
Third, the Seventh Circuit rejected Notre Dame’s argument 
that the self-certification requirement forces Notre Dame to identify 
and contract with a third party willing to provide the contraceptive 
coverage it finds morally objectionable.
198
 The court conceded that 
while Meritain could exit its contract with Notre Dame without 
liability if Meritain did not want to provide the contraceptives to Notre 
Dame’s employees, this “burden” is completely speculative under the 
facts of this case because Meritain does not object to providing 
contraceptive coverage and already does provide such services; 
therefore, the court found that this is not ground for equitable relief.
199
 
                                                 
193
 Id.  
194








 See id. at 557-58. 
199
 Id. at 557 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 104-05 
(1983)). 
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The court further noted that the process of claiming the exemption 
from the contraceptive mandate is the opposite of cumbersome, noting 
that all it requires Notre Dame to do is sign the form and mail copies 
of the signed form to Aetna and Meritain.
200
 While Notre Dame might 
find that this process is a substantial burden, the Seventh Circuit noted 
that substantiality is for the court to decide.
201
 
The Seventh Circuit ultimately found that Notre Dame failed to 
establish that the self-certification requirement imposes a substantial 
burden under RFRA and found support for its conclusion in Judge 
David Tatel’s dissent from the grant of an injunction pending appeal in 
Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services and Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Sebelius.
202
 The court quoted a 
large passage from Judge Tatel’s dissent, which can be summarized 
into two main principles: (1) Congress authorized insurers to provide 
contraceptive coverage, which are services that employees will receive 
regardless of whether their objecting religious organization self-
certifies; and (2) religious organizations’ objections are to the 
independent actions the government has taken in mandating 
contraceptive coverage, not to any action the government requires 
them to take, and the organizations have no right to require the 
government to conduct its affairs in ways that comport with the 
religious beliefs of particular citizens.
203
 Two cases, Bowen v. Roy
204
 
and Kaemmerling v. Lapin,
205
 were quoted in Judge Tatel’s dissent and 
will be discussed in the Argument section of this Comment to support 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Notre Dame.
206
 
                                                 
200




 Id. at 559 (quoting dissent from order entered in Priests for Life, No. 13-
5368 and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash., No. 13-5371 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 31, 
2013) (per curiam)). 
203
 Id.  
204
 See 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
205
 553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
206
 Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 559. 
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After finding that Notre Dame failed to show the likelihood of 
success on the merits of its RFRA claim, the Seventh Circuit affirmed 





D. Judge Flaum’s Dissent 
 
Judge Flaum disagreed with the majority and wrote a dissent, 
finding that Notre Dame did make a cognizable claim under RFRA.
208
 
Judge Flaum believed that Notre Dame had established the likelihood 
of success on the merits and would have granted its request for a 
preliminary injunction.
209
 Judge Flaum found that the contraceptive 
mandate and opt-out regulations imposed a substantial burden upon 
Notre Dame’s religious exercise because of the “ruinous fines” that 
Notre Dame would be forced to pay if it refused to self-certify and 
provide the contraceptive coverage which it finds morally 
objectionable.
210
 Although Judge Flaum noted that the accommodation 
to the contraceptive mandate was a good-faith attempt to meet 
religious objectors halfway, he still felt that the government 
nevertheless was putting substantial pressure on Notre Dame to act in 
ways that it believes involve the university in a system that provides 
contraceptive services to its employees and students, which is a 
substantial burden on Notre Dame’s religious exercise thereby running 
afoul of RFRA.
211
 Judge Flaum took issue with the district court’s 
reasoning that the self-certification process is not a substantial burden 
because it does not require Notre Dame to modify its behavior and that 
the university need only step aside from contraceptive coverage as it 
always has done and will surely always do.
212
 Judge Flaum stated that 
                                                 
207
 Id. at 559, 562. 
208
 See id. at 562-69 (Flaum, J., dissenting).  
209
 Id. at 562 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
210
 Id. at 564-65 (Flaum, J., dissenting) (quoting Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 
654, 684 (7th Cir. 2013).  
211
 Id. at 565 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
212
 Id. (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
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viewing the required act this way was too mechanistic because Notre 
Dame was required to perform a new act that it never had to before, 
filling out the self-certification form and sending it to Aetna and 
Meritain, which in Notre Dame’s eyes has the purpose and effect, 
evident from the face of the regulations, of accomplishing what the 
university finds religiously forbidden and protests – the provision of 
contraceptive services.
213
 Judge Flaum accepted Notre Dame’s theory 
that having to submit the form makes it complicit in sin, stating that 
judges are not theologians and thus should defer to Notre Dame’s 
understanding that Catholic doctrine forbids such action, so long as the 
belief is sincerely held.
214
 Judge Flaum also attempted, 
unconvincingly, to refute the majority’s statement that federal law 
triggers the contraceptive coverage regardless of whether Notre Dame 
signs the self-certification form by citing to Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Wash. v. Sebelius, which distinguished group health 
plan issuers, which have an independent duty to provide contraceptive 




Next, Judge Flaum attacked the district court’s reliance on 
Bowen v. Roy,
216
 and derivatively Kaemmerling v. Lapin,
217
 which the 
district court believed foreclosed Notre Dame’s objection to a mere 
administrative tool used to relieve the university of liability for not 
providing contraceptive payments.
218
 Judge Flaum believed that Roy 
                                                 
213
 Id. at 565-66 (Flaum, J., dissenting) (quoting E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. 
Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 743, 767 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2013)). 
214
 Id. at 566 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
215
 Id. at 566 (Flaum, J., dissenting) (citing Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
Wash. v. Sebelius, 19 F. Supp. 3d 48 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2013), affirmed in part and 
vacated in part by Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 
F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).  
216
 See 476 U.S. 693, 697-702 (1986) (holding that the statutory requirement 
that a state agency use Social Security numbers in administering benefits does not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause despite the plaintiffs’ religious belief that the use of 
their child’s number would rob her spirit). 
217
 553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
218
 Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 566 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
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did not cut so broadly and cited to the fact that “[f]ive justices either 
concluded or strongly suggested that the government could not require 
an applicant to provide the number on a benefits application if the 
applicant had a sincere religious objection to doing so.”
219
 Although 
Judge Flaum agreed that under Roy, RFRA does not permit a religious 
organization to dictate the independent actions of third parties even if 
the organization sincerely disagrees, he nevertheless found that the 
self-certification requirement was different, stating that it is one thing 
for the government to take independent action and quite another for 
the government to force Notre Dame to actively cooperate with the 
government by having the university provide the self-certification 
form, which Notre Dame believes endorses the provision of 
contraceptives to its employees and students in violation of its 
religious beliefs.
220
 Judge Flaum wrote that this type of compulsion 
takes the Notre Dame case out of the realm of independent action and 
“into the sort of direct, primary, and fundamental pressure that renders 
religious exercise ... effectively impracticable.”
221
  
Judge Flaum stated that the Supreme Court’s grant of a 
temporary injunction in Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius,
222
 
supports this view of free exercise rights and strengthens the case for 
issuing a preliminary injunction to Notre Dame.
223
 Judge Flaum 
explained that the form that the Little Sisters refuse to sign is 
unconnected to the provision of contraceptive services unlike the form 
that Notre Dame objects to, which will allow third parties to provide 
contraceptive services to its employees and students.
224
  
                                                 
219
 Id. at 566-67 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
220
 Id. at 567-68 (Flaum, J., dissenting) (citing Roy, 476 U.S. at 700). 
221
 Id. at 568 (Flaum, J., dissenting) (quoting Civil Liberties for Urban 
Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
222
 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014).  
223
 Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 568 (Flaum, J., dissenting) (explaining that the 
Little Sisters’ third-party administrator is a “church plan,” which is itself exempt 
from the contraceptive mandate under a provision of ERISA). 
224
 Id. at 568 (Flaum, J., dissenting) (finding the burden on Notre Dame to be 
more concrete than the burden on the Little Sisters). 
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 Finally, Judge Flaum concluded that while the court cannot 
enjoin Notre Dame’s insurers from providing contraceptive coverage 
or require the government to forbid the insurers from doing so, as a 
form of meaningful relief, Judge Flaum would “enjoin the government 
from enforcing the penalty against Notre Dame for not providing 
contraceptive coverage—even if Notre Dame revokes or fails to 
maintain its EBSA Form 700, refuses to make the form available for 
examination upon request, or takes any action otherwise inconsistent 




III. APPLICABLE SUPREME COURT CASES DECIDED AFTER NOTRE DAME 
 
A. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
 
On June 30, 2014, in Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court held for 
the first time that: (1) closely held for-profit corporations can bring 
claims under RFRA
226
 and (2) the contraceptive mandate violated 
RFRA as applied to closely held for-profit corporations.
227
 After 
deciding that RFRA applies to for-profit corporations, the Court found 
that the challenged regulations of the contraceptive mandate impose a 
substantial burden upon the free exercise of religion as applied to 
closely-held for-profit corporations whose owners object to 
contraceptive coverage on religious grounds.
228
 The Court found that 
the contraceptive mandate covers abortifacient drugs, which the 
plaintiffs object to on religious grounds, and imposes steep fines for 
noncompliance, which the Court found to constitute a substantial 
burden.
229
 The Court found that this substantial burden on the free 
exercise of religion was not justified because it failed the strict 
scrutiny test, as it was not the least restrictive means of furthering a 
                                                 
225
 Id. at 568 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
226
 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767-2775 
(2014). 
227
 Id. at 2785. 
228
 Id. at 2759. 
229
 Id.  
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 The Court found that the 
availability of the HHS accommodation for religious non-profits is 
less restrictive than requiring the for-profit plaintiffs to provide the 
contraceptive coverage in violation of their religious beliefs and would 
also serve HHS’s interests.
231
 The Court further found that this 
accommodation is “a system that seeks to respect the religious liberty 
of religious nonprofit corporations while ensuring that the employees 
of these entities have precisely the same access to all FDA-approved 
contraceptives as employees of companies whose owners have no 
religious objections to providing such coverage.”
232
 Although the 
accommodation did not extend to religious for-profit objectors, the 
Court noted that HHS had not provided a reason why it could not be 
applied to for-profits.
233
 The Court concluded that “this system 
constitutes an alternative that achieves all of the Government’s aims 
while providing greater respect for religious liberty,” and thus the 
enforcement of the contraceptive mandate against the objecting for-
profit plaintiffs is unlawful under RFRA.
234
  
Following the Hobby Lobby decision, HHS issued proposed 
rules soliciting comments on expanding the religious non-profit 
accommodation to include certain closely held for-profit corporations 








 Id. at 2759, 2782. 
232
 Id. at 2759. 
233
 Id.  
234
 Id. at 2759-60. 
235
 See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, Women’s 
Preventative Services Coverage and Non-Profit Religious Organizations, supra note 
99 (discussing the proposed approaches for defining a closely held for-profit 
organization who has a religious objection to the contraceptive mandate). 
40
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B. Wheaton College v. Burwell 
 
Three days after the Court decided Hobby Lobby, on July 3, 
2014, the Supreme Court decided Wheaton, where the Court granted 
Wheaton College, a Christian non-profit organization in Illinois, an 
injunction pending appeal, finding that Wheaton College was not 
required to comply with the self-certification requirement in order to 
receive the accommodation from the contraceptive mandate, which the 
college opposed on religious grounds.
236
  In a four-paragraph order, 
the Court held that if Wheaton College informs the Secretary of HHS 
in writing that it is a non-profit organization holding itself out as 
religious and that it has religious objections to providing contraceptive 
coverage, then the government is enjoined from enforcing the 
challenged provisions of the ACA against the college.
237
 Importantly, 
the Court held that in order to meet the condition for injunction 
pending appeal, Wheaton College did not have to fill out EBSA 700 
Form, the self-certification form, or send it to its health insurance 
issuer or third-party administrator.
238
  The Court noted that nothing in 
its order precludes the government from relying on Wheaton’s notice 
to the government to facilitate the provision of contraceptive coverage 
under the ACA.
239
 Finally, the Court noted that the order should not be 
construed as an expression of the Court’s views on the merits.
240
  
Justice Sotomayor penned a scathing dissent, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg and Kagan, which heavily relied on the Seventh Circuit’s 
reasoning in Notre Dame.
241
 The dissent rejected Wheaton’s argument 
that filing the self-certification form impermissibly burdens its free 
exercise of religion under RFRA by making it complicit in the 
provision of contraceptives by triggering the obligation for a third 
                                                 
236










 See id. at 2807-2815 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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party to provide the services that it objects to.
 242
 The dissent stated: 
“Wheaton has not stated a viable claim under RFRA. Its claim ignores 
that the provision of contraceptive coverage is triggered not by its 
completion of the self-certification form, but by federal law.”
243
 The 
dissent found that even assuming that the accommodation imposed a 
burden on Wheaton’s religious exercise, it still survives RFRA 
because it is the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling 
government interest in public health and women’s well-being.
244
  
The dissent strongly disagreed with the Court’s actions and 
found that the order in Wheaton was inconsistent with the Court’s 
Hobby Lobby decision issued a few days prior.
245
 The dissent quoted 
the Court in Hobby Lobby, which found that the ACA’s 
accommodation was a system that sought to respect the religious 
liberty of religious non-profits while still ensuring that their employees 
had the same access to all FDA-approved contraceptives as employees 
of companies whose owners have no religious objection to such 
coverage.
246
 The dissent took issue with the majority’s opinion in 
Wheaton, finding that the Court retreated from its position in Hobby 
Lobby, which expressly relied on the availability of the 
accommodation for religious non-profits as the impetus for its holding 




Concluding that Wheaton’s RFRA claim failed, the dissent 
argued that the Court granted extraordinary injunctive relief when it 
granted Wheaton College’s injunction pending review in the district 
court because Wheaton’s entitlement to relief is not indisputably 
                                                 
242
 Id. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
243
 Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
244
 Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
245
 Id. at 2808, 2810 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
246
 Id. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014)). 
247
 Id. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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 The dissent concluded that the Court’s grant of injunctive 
relief regarding the religious non-profit accommodation allowed 
“Wheaton’s beliefs about the effects of its actions to trump the 
democratic interest in allowing the Government to enforce the law.”
249
  
Finally, the dissent also attacked the majority’s attempt to 
rewrite the notice requirements under the HHS regulations for the 
accommodation, distinguishing this case from Little Sisters of the Poor 
v. Sebelius,
250
 where the Court had previously granted a similar 
injunction to a religious organization.
251
  The dissent argued that the 
two cases are critically different because the order in Little Sisters of 
the Poor was based on all of the circumstances of the case, particularly 
the fact that the third-party administrator was a “church plan” with no 
legal obligation or intention to provide contraceptive coverage, which 
is unlike Wheaton’s third-party administrator.
252
  
Following the Wheaton decision, the accommodation was 
revised to provide additional notice options for religious 
organizations.
253
 After Wheaton, an eligible religious organization can 
either notify its group health plan issuer and/or third-party 
administrator using the self-certification form or it can alternatively 





                                                 
248
 Id. at 2808-09, 2811-14 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the rare and 
extraordinary nature of an interlocutory injunction and the high bar necessary to 
warrant such relief and that Wheaton’s claim fails to meet this demanding standard). 
249
 Id. at 2815 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
250
 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014).  
251
 Wheaton, 134 S. Ct. at 2813, 2814 n.6 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
252
 Id. at 2814 n.6 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
253
 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c); 79 Fed. Reg. 51092 (August 27, 2014); 
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, Women’s Preventative Services 
Coverage and Non-Profit Religious Organizations, supra note 99.  
254
 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c). 
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In Notre Dame, the Seventh Circuit confronted the issue of 
whether the self-certification form required by the ACA in order to 
opt-out of providing contraceptive coverage was a substantial burden 
on Notre Dame’s religious rights under RFRA.
255
 The court found that 
the self-certification requirement did not impose a substantial burden 
and thus affirmed the denial of Notre Dame’s request for preliminary 
injunction, finding that Notre Dame failed to show the likelihood of 
success on the merits on its RFRA claim.
256
 The Seventh Circuit 
correctly decided Notre Dame because Notre Dame’s claim fails the 
RFRA test and fails under the standard for granting preliminary 
injunctions. 
 
A. Notre Dame’s Claim Fails the RFRA Test 
 
1. The ACA’s Accommodation Does Not Constitute a 
Substantial Burden 
 
To succeed on a RFRA claim, Notre Dame must first establish 
that a government action imposed a substantial burden upon its 
religious exercise.
257
 A substantial burden exists if the government 
puts “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to 
violate his beliefs.”
258
 “An inconsequential or de minimis burden on 
religious practice does not rise to this level, nor does a burden on 
activity unimportant to the adherent’s religious scheme.”
259
  
                                                 
255





 See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 682 (7th Cir. 2013).  
258
 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 
(1981). 
259
 Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 678-79 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding 
that the government’s extraction, analysis and storage of Kaemmerling’s DNA did 
not constitute a substantial burden under RFRA because Kaemmerling played no 
role in these FBI activities, which occurred after Kaemmerling provided the DNA 
44
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The ACA’s accommodation process is not a substantial burden 
under RFRA. Under this scheme, Notre Dame need only fill out the 
two-page self-certification form and send it to Aetna and Meritain to 
be relieved of its duties under the contraceptive mandate.
260
 Under the 
accommodation, Notre Dame is allowed to continue to not pay for and 
provide contraceptive services to its employees and students as it has 
always done.
261
 The ACA does not require Notre Dame to modify its 
behavior or beliefs in the slightest. Notre Dame’s argument that the 
form authorizes Aetna and Meritain to provide the contraceptive 
coverage is inapposite because it is federal law that requires these 
entities to provide the coverage, not Notre Dame, and the law allows 
Notre Dame to take no part in the provision of these services.
262
 
Congress authorized the health insurers and third-party administrators 




Although Notre Dame’s sincere religious beliefs deserve the 
utmost respect as religious liberty is among the most sacred rights 
Americans have, the ACA’s accommodation process, which allows 
Notre Dame to opt out of the challenged contraceptive mandate, does 
not substantially burden its religious rights just because Notre Dame 
believes it does.
264
 Notre Dame cannot argue that the accommodation, 
which requires third parties to provide the contraceptive coverage after 
Notre Dame notifies them of its exemption, is a substantial burden on 
its religion just because it believes that the provision of contraceptives 
                                                                                                                   
sample, which he did not object to, and thus the government did not hamper his 
religious exercise). 
260




 Id. at 557. 
263
 See id. at 559. 
264
 See Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (accepting 
as true the factual allegations that the plaintiff’s religious beliefs are sincere but 
finding that the court need not accept the legal conclusion that the plaintiff’s 
religious exercise is substantially burdened). 
45
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 “Burdens that are only slight, negligible, or de 
minimis are not substantial. And burdens that fall only on third parties 
not before the court do not substantially burden plaintiffs.”
266
 Thus, 
the self-certification requirement does not impose a substantial burden 
on Notre Dame’s religious practice because it merely requires sending 
the signed form to Aetna and Meritain so that Notre Dame can opt out 
of providing contraceptive coverage and so that these entities will pick 
up the slack under compulsion of federal law.
267
 Under the ACA, the 
government places the burden on Aetna and Meritain, not on Notre 
Dame. 
Furthermore, “[t]he self-certification form is just such an 
administrative tool, used to relieve Notre Dame of liability for not 
providing contraceptive payments.”
268
 As the district court judge in 
Notre Dame aptly noted, “[b]oiled to its essence, what Notre Dame 
essentially claims is that the government’s action after Notre Dame 
opts out, in requiring the TPA [(third-party administrator)] to cover 
contraception, offends Notre Dame’s religious sensibilities. And while 
I accept that the government’s and TPA’s actions do offend Notre 
Dame’s religious views, it’s not Notre Dame’s prerogative to dictate 
what healthcare services third parties may provide.”
269
  
In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court has held 
that the Free Exercise Clause does not “require the Government to 
conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious 
beliefs of particular citizens,” or “afford an individual a right to dictate 
the conduct of the Government’s internal procedures.”
270
 In Bowen v. 
                                                 
265
 See Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York v. Sebelius, 987 F. Supp. 2d 
232, 249 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2013) (finding that it is “unlikely that placing new legal 
obligations on the third-parties with whom plaintiffs contract could be a substantial 
burden on plaintiffs’ religion”). 
266
 Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 
248  (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
267
 Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 557 (7th Cir. 2014). 
268
 Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 
20, 2013) aff’d, 743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014). 
269
 Id. at 923. 
270
 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986). 
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Roy, the Court held that the statutory requirement that a state agency 
use a Social Security number to administer benefits programs did not 
violate RFRA despite the plaintiff’s religious belief that providing his 
daughter’s number would harm her spirit.
271
 The Court held that “Roy 
may no more prevail on his religious objection to the Government’s 
use of a Social Security number for his daughter than he could on a 
sincere religious objection to the size or color of the Government’s 
filing cabinets.”
272
 Roy forecloses Notre Dame’s argument because the 
university cannot demand that the government be enjoined from 
requiring Aetna and Meritain to provide the federally-mandated 
contraceptive coverage, which the university itself does not have to 
provide, simply because Notre Dame objects to contraceptive 
coverage on religious grounds. 
As the Seventh Circuit correctly noted, “while a religious 
institution has a broad immunity from being required to engage in acts 
that violate the tenets of its faith, it has no right to prevent other 
institutions, whether the government or a health insurance company, 
from engaging in acts that merely offend the institution.”
273
 Similarly, 
the D.C. Circuit has held that “[a] religious adherent’s distaste for 
what the law requires of a third party is not, in itself, a substantial 
burden; that is true even if the third party’s conduct towards others 
offends the religious adherent’s sincere religious sensibilities.”
274
 In 
the same vein, the Sixth Circuit has also found that: 
 
[A] government action does not constitute a substantial 
burden on the exercise of religion even if the 
challenged Government action would interfere 
significantly with private persons’ ability to pursue 
spiritual fulfillment according to their own religious 
                                                 
271
 Id.  
272
 Id. at 700. 
273
 Id. at 552 (citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 
U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986)). 
274
 Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 
256  (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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beliefs’ if the governmental action does not coerce the 
individuals to violate their religious beliefs or deny 





Thus, Notre Dame’s moral distaste for third parties providing 
the federally mandated contraceptive coverage does not rise to the 
level of a substantial burden on its religious rights. Notre Dame has 
“no RFRA right to be free from the unease, or even anguish, of 
knowing that third parties are legally privileged or obligated to act in 
ways their religion abhors.”
276
 Moreover, the accommodation process, 
in itself, did not coerce Notre Dame to engage in conduct that violates 
its beliefs but rather respected those beliefs in offering it a meaningful 
exemption from providing contraceptive coverage. 
United States v. Friday is the most analogous RFRA case to 
Notre Dame because in both cases, the respective plaintiff challenged 
the religious accommodation that the government granted.
277
 In 
Friday, the government provided Native Americans with a religious 
accommodation allowing for the taking of bald eagles for religious 
purposes despite a law banning such takings.
278
 The court was 
skeptical that the bare requirement of obtaining a permitting in order 
to be granted this accommodation can constitute a substantial burden 
under RFRA, noting that “[m]any religious activities, from building a 
church to homeschooling a child to obtaining peyote for a Native 
American Church ceremonial, require some form of advance 
authorization from the state.”
279
 Similarly, here, the accommodation 
allows Notre Dame to completely be uninvolved in the payment and 
provision of contraceptive services, which it objects to on religious 
                                                 
275
 Michigan Catholic Conference & Catholic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 755 
F.3d 372, 384 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
276
 Priests For Life, 772 F.3d at 246. 
277
 See Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 557-58 (7th Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 946-47 (10th Cir. 2008). 
278
 Friday, 525 F.3d at 942-44. 
279
 Id. at 947. 
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grounds, and the bare requirement that Notre Dame “self-certify” does 
not impose a substantial burden under RFRA.
280
  
Therefore, requiring Notre Dame to fill out the self-
certification form in order to opt out of providing, paying for and 
otherwise facilitating contraceptive coverage required by the ACA is 
not a substantial burden on its free exercise rights. The 
accommodation does not alter Notre Dame’s actions or violate its 
beliefs but rather strikes the perfect balance between respecting Notre 
Dame’s religious liberty and respecting its female employees’ and 
students’ federal right to free contraceptives. 
 
2. The ACA’s Accommodation Survives Strict Scrutiny 
 
Because the Seventh Circuit in Notre Dame concluded that the 
ACA’s accommodation to the contraceptive mandate and related 
regulations did not constitute a substantial burden on Notre Dame’s 
religious beliefs, the court did not address whether the accommodation 
would survive strict scrutiny.
281
 Alternatively, even if the 
accommodation imposed a substantial burden upon Notre Dame’s 
religious beliefs, the accommodation would still survive RFRA 
because it passes the strict scrutiny test.  
After a court determines that a substantial burden exists under 
RFRA, it must inquire whether the strict scrutiny test is satisfied.
282
 
Here, the government must show that the self-certification requirement 




In the context of the contraceptive mandate, in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court assumed that the 
government’s interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to contraceptive 
methods for all women was compelling within the meaning of 
                                                 
280
 See Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 557-58. 
281
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 85, at *13.   
282
 See Michigan Catholic Conf. & Catholic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 755 
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 The Court then moved on to the least-restrictive means test 
and found that the ACA’s accommodation is “a system that seeks to 
respect the religious liberty of religious nonprofit corporations while 
ensuring that the employees of these entities have precisely the same 
access to all FDA-approved contraceptives as employees of companies 
whose owners have no religious objections to providing such 
coverage” and concluded that “this system constitutes an alternative 
that achieves all of the Government’s aims while providing greater 
respect for religious liberty.”
285
 Given that this is the Court’s most 
recent proclamation regarding the contraceptive mandate 
accommodation, it is unlikely that the Court will backtrack and find 
that this established accommodation system violates RFRA because 
the availability of this accommodation for religious non-profits was 
the impetus of the Court’s holding that the contraceptive mandate 
violated RFRA as applied to closely-held for-profit corporations who 
objected on religious grounds but were not exempt under the ACA.
286
 
In the analogous RFRA case, United States v. Friday, where 
the plaintiff challenged a religious accommodation, the Tenth Circuit 
found that the permitting process allowing Native Americans to kill 
bald eagles for religious purposes despite a ban on such takings was 
valid under RFRA because it was the least restrictive means of 
pursuing the compelling government interest in preserving bald 
eagles.
287
 The Tenth Circuit aptly recognized that: 
 
By enacting a law banning the taking of eagles and then 
permitting religious exceptions, the government has 
tried to accommodate Native American religions while 
still achieving its compelling interests. That 
accommodation may be more burdensome than the 
                                                 
284
 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779-2780 (2014). 
285
 Id. at 2759. 
286
 See id. at 2782 (finding that the accommodation for religious non-profits, 
“[a]t a minimum . . . it does not impinge on the plaintiffs’ religious belief that 
providing insurance coverage for the contraceptives at issue here violates their 
religion, and it serves HHS’s stated interests equally well”). 
287
 525 F.3d 938, 942 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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Northern Arapaho would prefer, and may sometimes 
subordinate their interests to other policies not of their 
choosing. Law accommodates religion; it cannot 




In the context of the ACA accommodation, in Priests for Life 
v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, the D.C. Circuit held 
that the accommodation only imposes a de minimis burden on the 
religious non-profit plaintiffs that is justified by the government’s 
compelling interest “to provide cost-free contraceptive coverage and to 
remove administrative and logistical obstacles to accessing 
contraceptive care.”
 289
 The D.C. Circuit conducted a detailed analysis 
of other asserted government interests, such as improving public 
health through contraceptive coverage and assuring women the equal 
benefit of preventative care by requiring coverage of their distinctive 
health needs, and held that “[t]hose compelling governmental interests 
suffice to support requiring eligible organizations to ask for an 
accommodation if they want to take advantage of one, so that the 
government can protect its interests by ensuring that the resulting 
coverage gaps are filled.”
290
 The court concluded that the 
contraceptive mandate regulations are the least restrictive means to 
ensure contraceptive coverage while still accommodating religion:  
 
The accommodation is the least restrictive method of 
ensuring that women continue to receive contraceptive 
coverage in a seamless manner while simultaneously 
relieving the eligible organizations of any obligation to 
provide such coverage. Because the government has 
used the least restrictive means possible to further its 
compelling interest, RFRA does not excuse Plaintiffs 
from their duty under the ACA either to provide the 
                                                 
288
 Id. at 960 (emphasis added).  
289
 Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229,  
249, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
290
 Id. at 259-264. 
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required contraceptive coverage or avail themselves of 
the offered accommodation to opt out of that 
requirement. The accommodation meets the twin aims 
of respecting religious freedom and ensuring that 
women continue to receive contraceptive coverage 
without administrative, financial, or logistical burdens. 
The regulations thus respond appropriately to RFRA’s 
explicit demand for “sensible balances between 
religious liberty and competing prior governmental 
interests.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5).
291
 
Under Hobby Lobby and Priests for Life, it is clear that the 
contraceptive mandate serves compelling interests and that the 
accommodation is the least restrictive means of furthering these 
compelling government interests while still respecting Notre Dame’s 
religious liberty. Under Friday, it is evident that Notre Dame’s 
challenge to the ACA accommodation also falls flat under RFRA’s 
strict scrutiny test for the same reasons articulated above in Hobby 
Lobby and Priests for Life. Therefore, even if the accommodation 
process imposes a burden upon Notre Dame’s free exercise, it is the 
least restrictive means of furthering compelling government interests 
and therefore survives RFRA. 
 
B. Notre Dame’s Claim Fails Under the Standard for Preliminary 
Injunctions 
 
Despite the majority of lower courts granting a preliminary 
injunction in the contraceptive mandate challenges to the self-
certification requirement, three circuits, the Sixth, Seventh and D.C. 
Circuits, have denied injunctive relief, finding that the religious 
organizations did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of 
their RFRA claims against the contraceptive mandate 
                                                 
291
 Id. at 264-67. 
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 Thus, these circuits have correctly found that these 
RFRA claims challenging the contraceptive mandate accommodation 
fail to meet the standard for granting preliminary injunctions because 
the self-certification form is not a substantial burden under RFRA.
293
 
Under the high standard for preliminary injunctions, Notre Dame has 
failed to meet its burden to show that its RFRA claim is likely to 
succeed on the merits. Thus, the Seventh Circuit correctly affirmed the 
denial of such relief.
294
  
Injunctive relief should be rare because relief of this kind is 
“extraordinary” and should only be granted upon a clear showing that 
the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.
295
 The Supreme Court has stated 
that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that 
he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance 
of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public 
interest.”
296
 The Seventh Circuit’s test for determining whether to 
grant a preliminary injunction first asks whether the moving party has 
shown that it has “no adequate remedy at law and will suffer 
irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is denied” and that there is 
“some likelihood of success on the merits.”
297
 If the moving party 
meets this initial burden, then the court “weighs the competing harms 
to the parties if an injunction is granted or denied and also considers 
the public interest.”
298
 This equitable balancing occurs on a sliding-
                                                 
292
 See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 229; Michigan Catholic Conf. & Catholic 
Family Servs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2014); Univ. of Notre Dame v. 
Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014). 
293
 See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 244-256; Michigan Catholic Conf., 755 
F.3d at 382-90; Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 553-59. 
294
 Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 562. 
295
 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citing 
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). 
296
 Id. at 20. 
297
 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2011). 
298
 Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Planned 
Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 
972 (7th Cir. 2012), and Ezell, 651 F.3d at 694). 
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scale – “the greater the likelihood of success on the merits, the less 
heavily the balance of harms must tip in the moving party’s favor.”
299
 




Since Notre Dame has failed to make a cognizable RFRA 
claim, for the reasons cited above, it fails to meet its burden under the 
preliminary injunction test. Under the first threshold question, Notre 
Dame has failed to show that it will suffer irreparable harm if its 
request for preliminary injunction is denied. The Seventh Circuit 
correctly found that there would be no irreparable harm to Notre Dame 
if the court affirmed the denial of injunctive relief, as the court could 
not even figure out what Notre Dame wanted in the way of 
preliminary relief.
301
 Notre Dame had already complied with the ACA 
by fulfilling the self-certification requirement and thus effectively 
opted out of the contraceptive mandate.
302
  
Under the second prong of the preliminary injunction test, 
Notre Dame must show a likelihood of success on the merits of its 
RFRA claims, which it has failed to do, as described in detail above.
303
 
As the Sixth Circuit noted, “[w]hen a moving party seeks a 
preliminary injunction on the basis of a potential constitutional 
violation, the likelihood of success on the merits often will be the 
determinative factor.”
304
 Notre Dame’s overwhelming failure to show 
a likelihood of success on the merits is controlling here. Notre Dame 
failed to show a substantial burden under RFRA and in addition, the 
accommodation passes strict scrutiny. This demonstrates that the 
Seventh Circuit correctly denied injunctive relief.
305
 
                                                 
299
 Korte, 735 F.3d at 665 (citing Planned Parenthood, 699 F.3d at 972). 
300
 Id. at 665 (citing Stuller, Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., Inc., 695 F.3d 676, 
678 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
301
 Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 554 (7th Cir. 2014). 
302
 Id. at 552. 
303
 See id. at 554-59. 
304
 Michigan Catholic Conf. & Catholic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 
372, 382 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting City of Pontiac Retired Employees Ass’n v. 
Schimmel, 751 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2014)). 
305
 See Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 562. 
54
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 4
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss1/4




On balance, there is no harm to Notre Dame in denying its 
request for injunctive relief because the university complied with the 
self-certification requirement and thus effectively opted out of 
providing contraceptives to its employees and students.
306
 However, 
there is harm to the government as well as the public if Notre Dame 
was granted the preliminary injunction. For example, enjoining 
enforcement of the contraceptive mandate and its accommodation 
regulations against Notre Dame would deprive thousands of its female 
students and employees of their federal statutory right to contraceptive 
services.
307
 Moreover, if the court had granted Notre Dame’s 
preliminary injunction, this would impermissibly lower the standard 
for preliminary injunctions because Notre Dame has failed to make out 
a cognizable RFRA claim. It would also lower the standard for finding 
a “substantial burden” under RFRA by permitting plaintiffs to show de 
minimis, attenuated burdens. This would allow religious organizations 
that are morally opposed to any number of federal laws and 
regulations to challenge religious accommodations and succeed under 
RFRA. This would completely suffocate laws and thwart the 
government’s attempts to enforce such laws.  
Thus, Notre Dame’s claim fails the standard for preliminary 
injunctions, and the Seventh Circuit correctly affirmed the district 






 The new frontier of RFRA claims regarding the controversial 
contraceptive mandate has emerged in the context of challenges to the 
required self-certification form allowing religious non-profits to opt 
out of providing contraceptive services under the ACA. These claims 
present a unique challenge to the accommodation provided under the 
                                                 
306
 Id. at 552. 
307
 See Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2815 n.6 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (finding that the Court’s grant of an injunction pending 
appeal risks depriving hundreds of Wheaton College’s employees and students of 
their legal entitlement to contraceptive coverage). 
308
 See Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 562. 
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ACA as they assert that the accommodation process itself imposes a 
substantial burden on free exercise rights under RFRA. In University 
of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, the Seventh Circuit correctly held that 
Notre Dame failed to establish that the ACA’s accommodation process 
is a substantial burden under RFRA and therefore affirmed the denial 
of Notre Dame’s request for preliminary injunction.
309
 
Notre Dame filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on 
October 3, 2014. As of the publication of this article, it is yet to be 
seen if the Supreme Court will grant certiorari and reverse the decision 
of the Seventh Circuit in Notre Dame in light of Wheaton and Hobby 
Lobby; however, it is unlikely. As the Court noted in Hobby Lobby, 
the accommodation is “a system that seeks to respect the religious 
liberty of religious nonprofit corporations while ensuring that the 
employees of these entities have precisely the same access to all FDA-
approved contraceptives as employees of companies whose owners 
have no religious objections to providing such coverage.”
310
 The Court 
concluded, “this system constitutes an alternative that achieves all of 
the Government’s aims while providing greater respect for religious 
liberty.”
311
 It is therefore unlikely that the Court will find the ACA 
accommodation unlawful under RFRA. 
Notre Dame cannot have its cake and eat it too. The 
government reasonably accommodated Notre Dame by offering the 
university the option to opt out of the contraceptive mandate by 
merely filling out a two-page self-certification form and mailing it to 
Meritain and Aetna so that they would pick up the tab for 
contraceptive services for Notre Dame’s students and employees due 
to the university’s religious exemption. Requiring Notre Dame to fill 
out this form and mail it to Meritain and Aetna is not a substantial 
burden on its free exercise rights under RFRA. This was the least 
restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest. Thus, 
the Seventh Circuit correctly decided the Notre Dame case because 
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Notre Dame’s claim fails the RFRA test and fails under the standard 
for granting preliminary injunctions.  
Furthermore, if Notre Dame and other like religious non-
profits were granted a preliminary injunction every time they objected 
to an accommodation granted to it by the government, this would lead 
to a slippery slope where religious accommodations would suffocate 
laws. It would threaten to swallow the rule for RFRA and the high 
standard that the courts have set for granting injunctive relief. As the 
Tenth Circuit aptly noted: “Law accommodates religion; it cannot 
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